Arjan van de Ven wrote:
>> Let me see if I understand. If the kernel does this somewhere:
>>
>> struct s *foo;
>> foo->x->y = 0;
>>
>> and if there is some way that userland code can cause this to be
>> executed with 'foo' set to a NULL pointer, then user-land code can
>> do this:
>>
>> mmap(0, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC|PROT_WRITE,
>> MAP_FIXED|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0);
>> struct s *bar = 0;
>
>the question isn't if it's a good idea to allow mmap(0) but to allow
>mmap PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC !
Oops. Please ignore the PROT_EXEC. That is completely irrelevant.
I'm sorry I included it; the inclusion of PROT_EXEC was a mistake.
Delete PROT_EXEC, then re-read my email -- everything else in there is
still valid.
The security exploit I explained didn't involve executing anything
from the mmap'ed page; the kernel reads an address from this page,
and then dereferences it. Even without PROT_EXEC, it sounds like a
user-triggerable NULL pointer dereference in the kernel can create a
local root exploit (at least in some cases).
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to [email protected]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
[Index of Archives]
[Kernel Newbies]
[Netfilter]
[Bugtraq]
[Photo]
[Stuff]
[Gimp]
[Yosemite News]
[MIPS Linux]
[ARM Linux]
[Linux Security]
[Linux RAID]
[Video 4 Linux]
[Linux for the blind]
[Linux Resources]