On Sun, Sep 10, 2006 at 05:23:13PM +0100, Alan Cox wrote:
> CAP_REG_EXEC seems meaningless, I can do the same with mmap by hand for
> most types of binary execution except setuid (which is separate it
> seems)
Actually I meant those caps to be more of a proof of concept than as a
really useful set, so I have nothing against CAP_REG_EXEC being
deleted. However, it still performs one (small) function even in the
absence of suid/sgid executables: you can execute files with omde --x
which you can't do with mmap(). (Also, I'm not 100% sure the kernel
doesn't do some magic things on exec(), perhaps some magic forms of
accounting or whatever, which you couldn't do with mmap().)
> Given the capability model is accepted as inferior to things like
> SELinux policies why do we actually want to fix this anyway. It's
> unfortunate we can't discard the existing capabilities model (which has
> flaws) as well really.
Can a non-root user create limited-rights processes without assistance
from the sysadmin, under SElinux? I was under the impression that it
wasn't the case. Also, SElinux is immensely more difficult to
understand and operate with than a mere set of capabilities: and I
think that simplicity is (sometimes) of value.
--
David A. Madore
([email protected],
http://www.madore.org/~david/ )
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to [email protected]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
[Index of Archives]
[Kernel Newbies]
[Netfilter]
[Bugtraq]
[Photo]
[Stuff]
[Gimp]
[Yosemite News]
[MIPS Linux]
[ARM Linux]
[Linux Security]
[Linux RAID]
[Video 4 Linux]
[Linux for the blind]
[Linux Resources]
