On Sat, Sep 09, 2006 at 11:40:38AM +0000, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > > If you can find another uid to hijack, that other uid has bad
> > > problems. And I do not think you'll commonly find another uid to
> > > hijack.
> >
> > How about another gid, then? Should we reset all caps on sgid exec?
>
> Yes. Any setuid/setgid exec is a security barrier, and weird (or new)
> semantics may not cross that barrier.
Right, so what I was saying was: if you reset all regular caps on sgid
exec, anyone can trivially reset all regular caps by creating a sgid
program (users are always members of a great many groups so "finding
another gid to hijack" is trivial). So CAP_REG_SXID needs to be off
all the time, so we lose again.
But I'll make this a securebit ("unsanitized sxid"), with the behavior
you advertise as default (0).
> > Ultimately a compromise is to be reached between security and
> > flexibility... The problem is, I don't know who should make the
> > decision.
>
> Go for security here. (Normally, consensus on the list is needed for
> merging the patch).
I am now completely convinced the patch will never be merged. :-(
Linux will have useless caps forever...
--
David A. Madore
([email protected],
http://www.madore.org/~david/ )
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