Quoting David Madore ([email protected]):
> My patch doesn't change any of this (I've checked), since it uses
> inheritance rules for capabilities which are closely modeled upon
> those of {r,s,e}uid (in fact, that's my very reason for "changing"
> things), and since the bash method of dropping privileges is also kept
> woring.
Ah, ok. So there is in fact no change in setuid behavior at all then.
Do you have a little testsuite you've run which you could make available
someplace? Or a few test programs you could toss into a tarball and
call a testsuite? :)
> (b) necessary for security reasons (it is imperative that the parent
> of a suid root process cannot prevent that process from keeping
> privileges, otherwise we get the sendmail bug again).
Good point.
> To summarize my answer: as far as I know, my patch does not change
> suid behavior: I've taken great care not to let that happen. It does
> change the documented inheritance behavior of capabilities, but that
> is unavoidable.
>
> PS: I should be releasing a new version of my patch, along with a
> merged version of yours, very shortly.
Could you cc: the lsm list ([email protected])?
I'd particularly have Chris Wright give some comment as he's spent a
lot of time looking at capabilities.
thanks,
-serge
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