On Thu, Sep 07, 2006 at 12:27:31AM +0200, David Madore wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 06, 2006 at 01:25:31PM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > I'd recommend you split this patch into at least 3:
> > 1. move to 64-bit caps
> > 2. introduce your new caps
> > (perhaps even one new cap per patch)
> > 3. introduce the new inheritance rules
>
> Yes, that sounds like a good idea. I'll do that.
Done. Attached. Except that the order is
part1: move to 64-bit caps (and also re-enable CAP_SETPCAP),
where upper 32-bits are "regular" capabilities (but none defined)
part2: introduce the new inheritance rules
part3: introduce new ("regular") capabilities
Cheers,
--
David A. Madore
([email protected],
http://www.madore.org/~david/ )
fs/proc/array.c | 6 +++---
include/linux/capability.h | 30 +++++++++++++++++++-----------
kernel/capability.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
security/commoncap.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
security/dummy.c | 6 +++---
5 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index 0b615d6..6724fc2 100644
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -285,9 +285,9 @@ static inline char * task_sig(struct tas
static inline char *task_cap(struct task_struct *p, char *buffer)
{
- return buffer + sprintf(buffer, "CapInh:\t%016x\n"
- "CapPrm:\t%016x\n"
- "CapEff:\t%016x\n",
+ return buffer + sprintf(buffer, "CapInh:\t%016llx\n"
+ "CapPrm:\t%016llx\n"
+ "CapEff:\t%016llx\n",
cap_t(p->cap_inheritable),
cap_t(p->cap_permitted),
cap_t(p->cap_effective));
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 6548b35..e4f6065 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ #include <linux/compiler.h>
library since the draft standard requires the use of malloc/free
etc.. */
-#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION 0x19980330
+#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION 0x20060903
+#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_OLD_VERSION 0x19980330
typedef struct __user_cap_header_struct {
__u32 version;
@@ -35,10 +36,16 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_header_struct
} __user *cap_user_header_t;
typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
+ __u64 effective;
+ __u64 permitted;
+ __u64 inheritable;
+} __user *cap_user_data_t;
+
+typedef struct __user_cap_data_old_struct {
__u32 effective;
__u32 permitted;
__u32 inheritable;
-} __user *cap_user_data_t;
+} __user *cap_user_data_old_t;
#ifdef __KERNEL__
@@ -50,12 +57,12 @@ #include <asm/current.h>
#ifdef STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS
typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
- __u32 cap;
+ __u64 cap;
} kernel_cap_t;
#else
-typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t;
+typedef __u64 kernel_cap_t;
#endif
@@ -310,12 +317,13 @@ #define cap_t(x) (x)
#endif
-#define CAP_EMPTY_SET to_cap_t(0)
-#define CAP_FULL_SET to_cap_t(~0)
-#define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET to_cap_t(~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP))
-#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET to_cap_t(0)
+#define CAP_EMPTY_SET to_cap_t(0ULL)
+#define CAP_FULL_SET to_cap_t(~0ULL)
+#define CAP_REGULAR_SET to_cap_t(0xffffffff00000000ULL)
+#define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET to_cap_t(~0ULL)
+#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET to_cap_t(~0ULL)
-#define CAP_TO_MASK(x) (1 << (x))
+#define CAP_TO_MASK(x) (1ULL << (x))
#define cap_raise(c, flag) (cap_t(c) |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
#define cap_lower(c, flag) (cap_t(c) &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
#define cap_raised(c, flag) (cap_t(c) & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
@@ -351,8 +359,8 @@ static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(ke
#define cap_isclear(c) (!cap_t(c))
#define cap_issubset(a,set) (!(cap_t(a) & ~cap_t(set)))
-#define cap_clear(c) do { cap_t(c) = 0; } while(0)
-#define cap_set_full(c) do { cap_t(c) = ~0; } while(0)
+#define cap_clear(c) do { cap_t(c) = 0ULL; } while(0)
+#define cap_set_full(c) do { cap_t(c) = ~0ULL; } while(0)
#define cap_mask(c,mask) do { cap_t(c) &= cap_t(mask); } while(0)
#define cap_is_fs_cap(c) (CAP_TO_MASK(c) & CAP_FS_MASK)
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index c7685ad..bd003f9 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capget(cap_user_head
if (get_user(version, &header->version))
return -EFAULT;
- if (version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION) {
+ if (version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION
+ && version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_OLD_VERSION) {
if (put_user(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version))
return -EFAULT;
return -EINVAL;
@@ -82,8 +83,18 @@ out:
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
- if (!ret && copy_to_user(dataptr, &data, sizeof data))
- return -EFAULT;
+ if (!ret) {
+ if (version == _LINUX_CAPABILITY_OLD_VERSION) {
+ struct __user_cap_data_old_struct data_old;
+ data_old.effective = data_old.effective & 0xffffffffULL;
+ data_old.permitted = data_old.permitted & 0xffffffffULL;
+ data_old.inheritable = data_old.inheritable & 0xffffffffULL;
+ if (copy_to_user(dataptr, &data_old, sizeof data_old))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ } else
+ if (copy_to_user(dataptr, &data, sizeof data))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
return ret;
}
@@ -179,7 +190,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_head
if (get_user(version, &header->version))
return -EFAULT;
- if (version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION) {
+ if (version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION
+ && version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_OLD_VERSION) {
if (put_user(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version))
return -EFAULT;
return -EINVAL;
@@ -191,10 +203,23 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_head
if (pid && pid != current->pid && !capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
return -EPERM;
- if (copy_from_user(&effective, &data->effective, sizeof(effective)) ||
- copy_from_user(&inheritable, &data->inheritable, sizeof(inheritable)) ||
- copy_from_user(&permitted, &data->permitted, sizeof(permitted)))
- return -EFAULT;
+ if (version == _LINUX_CAPABILITY_OLD_VERSION) {
+ const cap_user_data_old_t data2 = (void *)data;
+ __u32 w;
+ if (copy_from_user(&w, &data2->effective, sizeof(w)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ effective = (__u64)w | 0xffffffff00000000ULL;
+ if (copy_from_user(&w, &data2->inheritable, sizeof(w)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ inheritable = (__u64)w | 0xffffffff00000000ULL;
+ if (copy_from_user(&w, &data2->permitted, sizeof(w)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ permitted = (__u64)w | 0xffffffff00000000ULL;
+ } else
+ if (copy_from_user(&effective, &data->effective, sizeof(effective)) ||
+ copy_from_user(&inheritable, &data->inheritable, sizeof(inheritable)) ||
+ copy_from_user(&permitted, &data->permitted, sizeof(permitted)))
+ return -EFAULT;
spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index f50fc29..91dc53d 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -244,13 +244,19 @@ static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid (
int old_suid)
{
if ((old_ruid == 0 || old_euid == 0 || old_suid == 0) &&
- (current->uid != 0 && current->euid != 0 && current->suid != 0) &&
- !current->keep_capabilities) {
- cap_clear (current->cap_permitted);
- cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
+ (current->uid != 0 && current->euid != 0 && current->suid != 0)) {
+ if (!current->keep_capabilities) {
+ current->cap_permitted
+ = cap_intersect (current->cap_permitted,
+ CAP_REGULAR_SET);
+ current->cap_effective
+ = cap_intersect (current->cap_effective,
+ CAP_REGULAR_SET);
+ }
}
if (old_euid == 0 && current->euid != 0) {
- cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
+ current->cap_effective = cap_intersect (current->cap_effective,
+ CAP_REGULAR_SET);
}
if (old_euid != 0 && current->euid == 0) {
current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted;
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 58c6d39..572a15b 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -37,11 +37,11 @@ static int dummy_ptrace (struct task_str
static int dummy_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t * effective,
kernel_cap_t * inheritable, kernel_cap_t * permitted)
{
- *effective = *inheritable = *permitted = 0;
+ *effective = *inheritable = *permitted = CAP_REGULAR_SET;
if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
if (target->euid == 0) {
- *permitted |= (~0 & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
- *effective |= (~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP) & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
+ *permitted |= (CAP_FULL_SET & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
+ *effective |= (CAP_FULL_SET & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP) & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
}
if (target->fsuid == 0) {
*permitted |= CAP_FS_MASK;
fs/exec.c | 4 +++
include/linux/binfmts.h | 1 +
kernel/capability.c | 2 +
security/commoncap.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 54135df..e4d0a2c 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -925,10 +925,13 @@ int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *
bprm->e_uid = current->euid;
bprm->e_gid = current->egid;
+ bprm->is_suid = 0;
+ bprm->is_sgid = 0;
if(!(bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)) {
/* Set-uid? */
if (mode & S_ISUID) {
+ bprm->is_suid = 1;
current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->e_uid = inode->i_uid;
}
@@ -940,6 +943,7 @@ int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *
* executable.
*/
if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) {
+ bprm->is_sgid = 1;
current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->e_gid = inode->i_gid;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h
index c1e82c5..c7fb183 100644
--- a/include/linux/binfmts.h
+++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ struct linux_binprm{
struct file * file;
int e_uid, e_gid;
kernel_cap_t cap_inheritable, cap_permitted, cap_effective;
+ char is_suid, is_sgid;
void *security;
int argc, envc;
char * filename; /* Name of binary as seen by procps */
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index bd003f9..c090570 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */
-kernel_cap_t cap_bset = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
+kernel_cap_t cap_bset = CAP_INIT_INH_SET;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(securebits);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bset);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 91dc53d..39596b4 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -97,6 +97,8 @@ int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct
if (!cap_issubset (*effective, *permitted)) {
return -EPERM;
}
+ /* we allow Inheritable not to be a subset of Permitted:
+ * cap_capset_set will intersect them anyway */
return 0;
}
@@ -105,7 +107,7 @@ void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
target->cap_effective = *effective;
- target->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
+ target->cap_inheritable = cap_intersect (*effective, *inheritable);
target->cap_permitted = *permitted;
}
@@ -114,25 +116,20 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_
/* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */
/* We don't have VFS support for capabilities yet */
- cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable);
+ cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
cap_clear (bprm->cap_permitted);
- cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective);
+ cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective);
/* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
* executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three
* capability sets for the file.
- *
- * If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable
- * and permitted sets of the executable file.
*/
-
if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) {
- if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
+ if (bprm->is_suid && bprm->e_uid == 0) {
cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted);
- }
- if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective);
+ }
}
return 0;
}
@@ -140,13 +137,25 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_
void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
{
/* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */
- kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working;
+ kernel_cap_t new_permitted, new_effective, working;
+ uid_t old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid;
+ /* P'(per) = (P(inh) & F(inh)) | (F(per) & bset) */
new_permitted = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted, cap_bset);
working = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_inheritable,
current->cap_inheritable);
new_permitted = cap_combine (new_permitted, working);
+ /* P'(eff) = (P(inh) & P(eff) & F(inh)) | (F(per) & F(eff) & bset) */
+ new_effective = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted, bprm->cap_effective);
+ new_effective = cap_intersect (new_effective, cap_bset);
+ working = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_inheritable,
+ current->cap_effective);
+ working = cap_intersect (working, current->cap_inheritable);
+ new_effective = cap_combine (new_effective, working);
+
+ /* P'(inh) = P'(per) */
+
if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid ||
!cap_issubset (new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) {
current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
@@ -159,25 +168,27 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_
if (!capable (CAP_SETPCAP)) {
new_permitted = cap_intersect (new_permitted,
current->cap_permitted);
+ new_effective = cap_intersect (new_permitted,
+ new_effective);
}
}
}
+ old_ruid = current->uid;
+ old_euid = current->euid;
+ old_suid = current->suid;
current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
- /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set
- * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual
- * capability rules */
- if (current->pid != 1) {
- current->cap_permitted = new_permitted;
- current->cap_effective =
- cap_intersect (new_permitted, bprm->cap_effective);
- }
-
- /* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
+ current->cap_permitted = new_permitted;
+ current->cap_effective = new_effective;
+ current->cap_inheritable = new_permitted;
current->keep_capabilities = 0;
+ /* Make sure we drop capabilities if required by suid. */
+ cap_task_post_setuid (old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_RES);
+
+ /* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
}
int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -187,8 +198,8 @@ int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_bi
test between the old and new capability sets. For now,
it simply preserves the legacy decision algorithm used by
the old userland. */
- return (current->euid != current->uid ||
- current->egid != current->gid);
+ return ((bprm->is_suid || bprm->is_sgid)
+ && !cap_issubset (cap_bset, current->cap_permitted));
}
int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value,
@@ -253,12 +264,15 @@ static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid (
= cap_intersect (current->cap_effective,
CAP_REGULAR_SET);
}
+ current->cap_inheritable
+ = cap_intersect (current->cap_inheritable,
+ CAP_REGULAR_SET);
}
- if (old_euid == 0 && current->euid != 0) {
+ if (old_euid == 0 && current->euid != 0 && !current->keep_capabilities) {
current->cap_effective = cap_intersect (current->cap_effective,
CAP_REGULAR_SET);
}
- if (old_euid != 0 && current->euid == 0) {
+ if (old_euid != 0 && current->euid == 0 && !current->keep_capabilities) {
current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted;
}
}
fs/exec.c | 7 +++++--
fs/open.c | 10 ++++++++--
include/linux/capability.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++
kernel/fork.c | 2 ++
4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index e4d0a2c..1cb5e34 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -930,7 +930,7 @@ int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *
if(!(bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)) {
/* Set-uid? */
- if (mode & S_ISUID) {
+ if (mode & S_ISUID && capable(CAP_REG_SXID)) {
bprm->is_suid = 1;
current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->e_uid = inode->i_uid;
@@ -942,7 +942,8 @@ int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *
* is a candidate for mandatory locking, not a setgid
* executable.
*/
- if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) {
+ if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)
+ && capable(CAP_REG_SXID)) {
bprm->is_sgid = 1;
current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->e_gid = inode->i_gid;
@@ -1137,6 +1138,8 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
int retval;
int i;
+ if (!capable(CAP_REG_EXEC))
+ return -EPERM;
retval = -ENOMEM;
bprm = kzalloc(sizeof(*bprm), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bprm)
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 303f06d..3d1fc1c 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -1104,7 +1104,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_open(const char __us
if (force_o_largefile())
flags |= O_LARGEFILE;
- ret = do_sys_open(AT_FDCWD, filename, flags, mode);
+ if (capable(CAP_REG_OPEN))
+ ret = do_sys_open(AT_FDCWD, filename, flags, mode);
+ else
+ ret = -EPERM;
/* avoid REGPARM breakage on x86: */
prevent_tail_call(ret);
return ret;
@@ -1119,7 +1122,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_openat(int dfd, cons
if (force_o_largefile())
flags |= O_LARGEFILE;
- ret = do_sys_open(dfd, filename, flags, mode);
+ if (capable(CAP_REG_OPEN))
+ ret = do_sys_open(dfd, filename, flags, mode);
+ else
+ ret = -EPERM;
/* avoid REGPARM breakage on x86: */
prevent_tail_call(ret);
return ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index e4f6065..b3a3b27 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -295,6 +295,23 @@ #define CAP_AUDIT_WRITE 29
#define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL 30
+
+/**
+ ** Regular capabilities (normally possessed by all processes).
+ **/
+
+/* Can fork() */
+#define CAP_REG_FORK 32
+
+/* Can open() */
+#define CAP_REG_OPEN 33
+
+/* Can exec() */
+#define CAP_REG_EXEC 34
+
+/* Might gain permissions on exec() */
+#define CAP_REG_SXID 35
+
#ifdef __KERNEL__
/*
* Bounding set
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index f9b014e..20f559f 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1347,6 +1347,8 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
struct pid *pid = alloc_pid();
long nr;
+ if (!capable(CAP_REG_FORK))
+ return -EPERM;
if (!pid)
return -EAGAIN;
nr = pid->nr;
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