On 7/18/06, Anssi Hannula <[email protected]> wrote:
Dmitry Torokhov wrote:
> Hi Anssi,
>
> On 7/18/06, Anssi Hannula <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> Currently most distributions have /dev/input/event* strictly as 0600
>> root:root or 0640 root:root. The user logged in will not have rights to
>> the device, unlike /dev/input/js*, as he could read all passwords from
>> the keyboard device.
>>
>> This is a problem, because /dev/input/event* is used for force feedback
>> and should therefore be user-accessible.
>>
>> I can think of the following solutions to this problem:
>>
>> 1. Some creative udev rule to chmod /dev/input/event* less strictly when
>> it has a /dev/input/js* and is thus a gaming device.
>>
>> 2. Some creative udev rule to chmod /dev/input/event* more strictly when
>> it is a keyboard.
>>
>> 3. Have another force feedback interface also in /dev/input/js*.
>>
>
> You can do it in udev looking either at MODALIAS or at EV and ABS
> environment variables. I think it is pretty safe to say that a device
> with EV_ABS, EV_FF, ABS_X and ABS_Y is a force-feedback joystick-type
> device and not a keyboard.
Okay, thanks. But I think it'd be more consistant if all devices that
have js* entries would have the relaxed perms in event*. Looking at
joydev.c, that seems to be devices where EV_ABS && (ABS_X || ABS_WHEEL
|| ABS_THROTTLE) && !(EV_KEY && BTN_TOUCH).
OK, you can do that too.
There's another problem, too:
Some distros (Fedora, Mandriva...) don't use groups with /dev/input/jsX,
they use pam_console to chmod the device to the console owner.
Unfortunately, it allows to specify the permissions based on device file
names only.
To solve this problem, I see two solutions:
1. Have the pam_console_apply program extended so that it can perform
more complex matches (but what kind of matches would those be?).
2. Have udev create symlinks like the following case:
/dev/input/event3
/dev/input/js0
/dev/input/jsevent0 => event3
Then pam_console_apply could match jsevent[0-9]* and it would follow the
symlink, thus chowning event3 to the wanted user.
Unfortunately neither look too good to me. Do you have any other ideas?
I think this is really up to particular destribution to decide how
they want to handle security/granting access. One could even imagine
writing SELinux policies...
> Another solution would be to relax permissions if user is also console
> owner (home box installation).
I thought of that too, but I thought it's too big a security risk, as
it's not guaranteed that somebody else won't temporarily login on
another terminal.
That is what you are doing with pam_console_apply, don't you?
--
Dmitry
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to [email protected]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
[Index of Archives]
[Kernel Newbies]
[Netfilter]
[Bugtraq]
[Photo]
[Stuff]
[Gimp]
[Yosemite News]
[MIPS Linux]
[ARM Linux]
[Linux Security]
[Linux RAID]
[Video 4 Linux]
[Linux for the blind]
[Linux Resources]