Already fixed since 07/06/2006: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-2.6.17.y.git;a=commit;h=0af184bb9f80edfbb94de46cb52e9592e5a547b0 http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-2.6.17.y.git;a=commitdiff;h=0af184bb9f80edfbb94de46cb52e9592e5a547b0;hp=52cbb7b78994ea3799f1bbb8c03bce1e2f72a271 On Wed, 2006-07-12 at 13:12 +0200, Marcel Holtmann wrote: > Hi Linus, > > attached is the fix with full explanation for CVE-2006-2451. It fixes a > possible privilege escalation through the prctl() system call. > > I also put Michael Kerrisk on CC, because the manual page of prctl() > needs adjustment. The value 2 for the PR_SET_DUMPABLE flag is no longer > valid after this patch. The only way to get root-owned core dumps is > through /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable and the manual page should reflect > that. > > Regards > > Marcel -- Micskó Gábor HP APS, AIS, ASE Szintézis ZRt. H-9023 Győr, Tihanyi Á. u. 2. Tel: +36 96 502 216 Fax: +36 96 318 658 E-mail: [email protected]
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