If the SMRAM control register exists, the D_LCK bit can be set
in 16-bit mode during the boot sequence. This makes the SMRAM
register read/only so the long potential compromise sequence
that Mr. Duflot describes would not be possible. If the control
register doesn't exist, then the vulnerably doesn't exist.
No, if there is no mechanism to lock down SMmode (re)configuration,
the vulnerability of course _does_ exist.
The writer doesn't like the fact that a root process can execute
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