Re: [ANNOUNCE] Release Digsig 1.5: kernel module for run-time authentication of binaries

["Ulrich Drepper" <drepper@gmail.com>]

On 4/24/06, Nix <nix@esperi.org.uk> wrote:
> > But preventing every type of code loading or generation at userlevel
> > cannot be prevented this way.
>
> Oh, indeed not. It's just a stopgap that blocks some (large) percentage
> of script kiddy attacks that involve downloading binaries and then
> executing them, or even compiling them on the spot (not that those are
> as common these days).

Script kiddies don't write the exploit code themselves.  And for those
who write the code it is no problem to circumvent the signature
testing.


> Yeah. I'll admit I've found signed binaries principally useful on
> stripped-down firewalls and firewall UML instances. These boxes don't
> tend to run, say, CLISP or SBCL or OpenOffice (at least if they do the
> firewall maintainer needs shooting).

But they have Perl, Python, etc.  Those are sufficient.  Heck, I can
cause havor with bash.


> Combine it with SELinux, exec-shield, FORTIFY_SOURCE, -fstack-protector
> and, say, a COWed filesystem read off a CD and reset with every boot,
> and you start to get a bit less insecure than you would otherwise be.

Take signed binaries off of this list and you don't lose anything.


> It's another hurdle for the bad guys to leap, and many will fall at the
> wayside.

It is a little one-time effort.  This approach differs in that it
simply shifts the way binaries are introduced.  I can write a dynamic
loader in Perl.  and after that I don't load ELF binaries through the
kernel ever again.  If such a loader doesn't exist today it could very
well exist in a few months and after that this "protection" is
completely useless.  Every script kiddy will have it.

This is the big difference to techniques like randomization which
might be circumventent with a certain probability but never fully can
be removed.  Stacking those kind of protections is a good idea
because, if they are not fully correlated, the stacking provides
additional protection.  Signed binaries do not.
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