Re: [RESEND][RFC][PATCH 2/7] implementation of LSM hooks

[Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>]

On Mon, 2006-04-17 at 18:44 -0700, Gerrit Huizenga wrote:
> On Mon, 17 Apr 2006 23:55:25 BST, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 17, 2006 at 03:15:29PM -0700, Gerrit Huizenga wrote:
> > > configure correctly that most of them disable it.  In theory, LSM +
> > > something like AppArmour provides a much simpler security model for
> > 
> > apparmor falls into the findamentally broken category above, so it's
> > totally uninteresting except as marketing candy for the big red company.
> 
> Is there a pointer to why it is fundamentally broken?  I haven't seen
> such comments before but it may be that I've been hanging out on the
> wrong lists or spending too much time inhaling air at 30,000 feet.

See the last para of the Useability discussion from the SELinux summit
minutes:
http://www.selinux-symposium.org/2006/summit.php
(re a proposal for pathname-based configuration in SELinux, and why it isn't a good idea)

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency

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