PTRACE_TRACEME doesn't have proper capabilities validation when
parent is less privileged than child. Issue pointed out by
Ram Gupta <[email protected]>.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <[email protected]>
Cc: Ram Gupta <[email protected]>
---
Note: I haven't identified a strong security issue, and it's a small
ABI change that could break apps that rely on existing behaviour (which
allows parent that is less privileged than child to ptrace when child
does PTRACE_TRACEME).
security/commoncap.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- linus-2.6.orig/security/commoncap.c
+++ linus-2.6/security/commoncap.c
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, str
int cap_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
{
/* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
- if (!cap_issubset (child->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) &&
- !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ if (!cap_issubset(child->cap_permitted, parent->cap_permitted) &&
+ !__capable(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
-
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