Re: [PATCH] capability: Fix bug in checking capabilties in ptrace system call

[Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>]

* Ram Gupta (ram.gupta5@gmail.com) wrote:
> This patch fixes a bug of ptrace for PTRACE_TRACEME request. In this
> case the call is made by the child process & code needs to check the
> capabilty of the parent process to trace the child process but code
> incorrectly makes check for the child process.

Actually, that check is never triggered, for slightly subtle reason.

> Signed-off-by: Ram Gupta <ram.gupta5@gmail.com>
> 
> --- linux-2.6.14-patch-2.6.15/security/commoncap.c.orig Wed Mar  8 13:54:06 2006
> +++ linux-2.6.14-patch-2.6.15/security/commoncap.c      Wed Mar  8 13:57:07 2006
> @@ -59,9 +59,13 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, str
>  int cap_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
>  {
>         /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
> -       if (!cap_issubset (child->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) &&

In the context of TRACEME, child == current.

Historically, there's been no default security check for TRACEME, so
a change here has some small chance of breaking things (which would
be fine for plugging a real security hole).  Parent less privileged
than child which did TRACEME is a bit of a contrived case, so security
implications aren't so worrisome.  Modules like SELinux will actually
check this case, and should properly restrict.  We can try a change in
-mm for a while.

> -           !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
> -               return -EPERM;
> +       if (!cap_issubset (child->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted)){
> +               if(!security_ops->capable(parent,CAP_SYS_PTRACE)){

This is not valid when !CONFIG_SECURITY.

thanks,
-chris
--
-
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