Russell King <[email protected]> writes:
> My point stands - if the user can provide an arbitary string to printk,
> they can fake any kernel message. That in itself is a security bug.
> If there is an instance of that, then that's the real bug which would
> need fixing.
I think the AT problem is valid - the user doesn't have to be able to
send anything to the console, the system alone can screw it up with
something as simple as ATZ^M (or with almost any string with embedded
[aA][tT].*^M).
_If_ we want to be able to connect a serial console to dial-up modem
we can't send _anything_ to it when DCD is down (except configuration
strings etc). I don't know exact timings but the modem will probably
accept commands hundreds of milliseconds after dropping DCD.
There are/were modems which could be configured using a jumper to
password-protected power-on dial-in mode and which doesn't accept
further Hayes commands - those are safe (they don't even abort
inbound connection negotiation if they receive characters from
the computer).
--
Krzysztof Halasa
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