Re: [Secure-testing-team] Re: kernel allows loadkeys to be used by any user, allowing for local root compromise

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• Subject: Re: [Secure-testing-team] Re: kernel allows loadkeys to be used by any user, allowing for local root compromise
• From: Anthony DeRobertis <[email protected]>
• Date: Wed, 19 Oct 2005 00:14:10 -0400
• Cc: Horms <[email protected]>, [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], Rudolf Polzer <[email protected]>, Alastair McKinstry <[email protected]>, [email protected]
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Krzysztof Halasa wrote:

> Why doesn't the intruder just simulate login process (printing "login: "
> and "Password:")? That's known and used for ages.

Well, you can configure a single vty to only allow logins from admins.
Then you avoid the fake login problem, but not the loadkeys problem
(since that affects all vtys)
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