[PATCH 12/14] Big kfree NULL check cleanup - security

[Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>]

This is the security/ part of the big kfree cleanup patch.

Remove pointless checks for NULL prior to calling kfree() in security/.


Sorry about the long Cc: list, but I wanted to make sure I included everyone
who's code I've changed with this patch.


Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
---

Please see the initial announcement mail on LKML with subject
"[PATCH 00/14] Big kfree NULL check cleanup"
for additional details.

 security/keys/key.c            |    3 +--
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c |   12 ++++++------
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- linux-2.6.14-rc4-orig/security/keys/key.c	2005-10-11 22:41:35.000000000 +0200
+++ linux-2.6.14-rc4/security/keys/key.c	2005-10-13 11:47:59.000000000 +0200
@@ -114,8 +114,7 @@ struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t u
  found:
 	atomic_inc(&user->usage);
 	spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
-	if (candidate)
-		kfree(candidate);
+	kfree(candidate);
  out:
 	return user;
 
--- linux-2.6.14-rc4-orig/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c	2005-10-11 22:41:35.000000000 +0200
+++ linux-2.6.14-rc4/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c	2005-10-13 11:49:17.000000000 +0200
@@ -633,22 +633,22 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p
 	cond_policydb_destroy(p);
 
 	for (tr = p->role_tr; tr; tr = tr->next) {
-		if (ltr) kfree(ltr);
+		kfree(ltr);
 		ltr = tr;
 	}
-	if (ltr) kfree(ltr);
+	kfree(ltr);
 
 	for (ra = p->role_allow; ra; ra = ra -> next) {
-		if (lra) kfree(lra);
+		kfree(lra);
 		lra = ra;
 	}
-	if (lra) kfree(lra);
+	kfree(lra);
 
 	for (rt = p->range_tr; rt; rt = rt -> next) {
-		if (lrt) kfree(lrt);
+		kfree(lrt);
 		lrt = rt;
 	}
-	if (lrt) kfree(lrt);
+	kfree(lrt);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++)
 		ebitmap_destroy(&p->type_attr_map[i]);



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