Hi!
> > To prevent data gathering from swap after resume you can encrypt the
> > suspend image with a temporary key that is deleted on resume. Note
> > that the temporary key is stored unencrypted on disk while the system
> > is suspended... still it means that saved data are wiped from disk
> > during resume by simply overwritting the key.
>
> hm, how useful is that? swap can still contain sensitive userspace
> stuff.
At least userspace has chance to mark *really* sensitive stuff as
unswappable. Unfortunately that does not work against swsusp :-(.
[BTW... I was thinking about just generating random key on swapon, and
using it, so that data in swap is garbage after reboot; no userspace
changes needed. What do you think?]
> Are there any plans to allow the user to type the key in on resume?
Plans... ;-).
> > +Encrypted suspend image:
> > +------------------------
> > +If you want to store your suspend image encrypted with a temporary
> > +key to prevent data gathering after resume you must compile
> > +crypto and the aes algorithm into the kernel - modules won't work
> > +as they cannot be loaded at resume time.
>
> Why not just `select' the needed symbols in Kconfig? It makes
> configuration much easier for the user.
>
> > + if(!*tfm) {
> > + if(sizeof(key) < crypto_tfm_alg_min_keysize(*tfm)) {
> > + if (mode) {
>
> Coding style nit: please use a single space after `if'.
>
> > +fail: crypto_free_tfm(*tfm);
> > +out: return error;
>
> We conventionally insert a newline directly after labels.
>
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SWSUSP_ENCRYPT
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SWSUSP_ENCRYPT
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SWSUSP_ENCRYPT
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SWSUSP_ENCRYPT
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SWSUSP_ENCRYPT
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SWSUSP_ENCRYPT
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SWSUSP_ENCRYPT
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SWSUSP_ENCRYPT
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SWSUSP_ENCRYPT
>
> err, no. Please find a way to reduce the ifdeffery.
Andreas, these are yours.
Pavel
--
teflon -- maybe it is a trademark, but it should not be.
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