> However, a few things:
>
> - is there anything in the current implementation of the permission stuff
> which might tie our hands if it is later reimplemented? IOW: does the
> current FUSE user interface in any way lock us into the current FUSE
> implementation (fuse_allow_task())?
No. This thing is above the userspace interface and completely
independent. Either a task is allowed, and then the request goes
through to the interface. Or if it's not, the request is stopped
right there, and never reaches the userspace interface.
> - the fuse mount options don't seem to be documented
True. I'll send a patch (they are documented in the README of the
fuse distribution).
> - aren't we going to remove the nfs semi-server feature?
I leave the decision to you ;) It's a separate independent patch
already (fuse-nfs-export.patch).
> - Frank points out that a user can send a sigstop to his own setuid(0)
> task and he intimates that this could cause DoS problems with FUSE. More
> details needed please?
Will follow up in Franks answer.
> - I don't recall seeing an exhaustive investigation of how an
> unprivileged user could use a FUSE mount to implement DoS attacks against
> other users or against root.
Here's a description of a theoretical DoS scenario:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-fsdevel&m=111522019516694&w=2
Miklos
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