[patch 7/7] BSD Secure Levels: remove redundant ptrace check

[Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>]

This is the seventh in a series of seven patches to the BSD Secure
Levels LSM.  It removes the ptrace check because it is redundant with
the check made in kernel/ptrace.c.  Thanks for Brad Spengler for this
suggestion.

Signed off by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>

Index: linux-2.6.12-rc4-mm2-seclvl/security/seclvl.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.12-rc4-mm2-seclvl.orig/security/seclvl.c	2005-05-16 16:31:36.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.12-rc4-mm2-seclvl/security/seclvl.c	2005-05-16 16:33:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -396,23 +396,6 @@
        seclvl_write_passwd);
 
 /**
- * Explicitely disallow ptrace'ing the init process.
- */
-static int seclvl_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
-{
-	if (seclvl >= 0) {
-		if (child->pid == 1) {
-			seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING "%s: Attempt to ptrace "
-				      "the init process dissallowed in "
-				      "secure level %d\n", __FUNCTION__,
-				      seclvl);
-			return -EPERM;
-		}
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/**
  * Capability checks for seclvl.  The majority of the policy
  * enforcement for seclvl takes place here.
  */
@@ -631,7 +614,6 @@
 }
 
 static struct security_operations seclvl_ops = {
-	.ptrace = seclvl_ptrace,
 	.capable = seclvl_capable,
 	.file_permission = seclvl_file_permission,
 	.inode_setattr = seclvl_inode_setattr,
-
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