On Fri, May 13, 2005 at 07:00:12PM -0400, Lee Revell wrote:
> On Fri, 2005-05-13 at 23:47 +0100, Alan Cox wrote:
> > On Gwe, 2005-05-13 at 22:59, Matt Mackall wrote:
> > > It might not be much of a problem though. If he's a bit off per guess
> > > (really impressive), he'll still be many bits off by the time there's
> > > enough entropy in the primary pool to reseed the secondary pool so he
> > > can check his guesswork.
> >
> > You can also disable the tsc to user space in the intel processors.
> > Thats something they anticipated as being neccessary in secure
> > environments long ago. This makes the attack much harder.
>
> And break the hundreds of apps that depend on rdtsc? Am I missing
> something?
If those apps depend on rdtsc being a) present, and b) working
without providing fallbacks, they're already broken.
There's a reason its displayed in /proc/cpuinfo's flags field,
and visible through cpuid. Apps should be testing for presence
before assuming features are present.
Dave
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to [email protected]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
[Index of Archives]
[Kernel Newbies]
[Netfilter]
[Bugtraq]
[Photo]
[Stuff]
[Gimp]
[Yosemite News]
[MIPS Linux]
[ARM Linux]
[Linux Security]
[Linux RAID]
[Video 4 Linux]
[Linux for the blind]
[Linux Resources]
