Jivin Jeff Garzik lays it down ...
...
> >If kernelspace can assist and driver _knows_ in advance that data
> >produced is cryptographically strong, why not allow it directly
> >access pools?
>
> A kernel driver cannot know in advance that the data from a hardware RNG
> is truly random, unless the data itself is 100% validated beforehand.
You can also say that it cannot know that data written to /dev/random
is truly random unless it is also validated ?
For argument you could just run "cat < /dev/hwrandom > /dev/random"
instead of using rngd.
If /dev/random demands a level of randomness, shouldn't it enforce it ?
If the HW is using 2 random sources, a non-linear mixer and a FIPS140
post processor before handing you a random number it would be nice to
take advantage of that IMO.
Cheers,
Davidm
--
David McCullough, [email protected] Ph:+61 7 34352815 http://www.SnapGear.com
Custom Embedded Solutions + Security Fx:+61 7 38913630 http://www.uCdot.org
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