Re-sent with proper addressing ...
Rob Meijer wrote:
>> The
>> system is "defended" in that the worst the attacker can do to corrupt
>> the system is limited to the transitive closure of what the confined
>> processes are allowed to access.
>>
> The damage the atacker can do would be defined by the authority not the
> permissions the process has.
>
As far as I can tall, the transitive closure of permissions is precisely
authority.
>> * AppArmor confines processes if they are children of a confined
>> process, or if the name of the exec'd child matches the name of an
>> AppArmor profile.
>>
> What is left unspecified here is 'how' a child 'with its own profile' is
> confined here. Are it is confined to just its own profile, it may that
> the "complicit process" communication may need to be wider specified to
> include this.
>
It is deliberately unspecified in this document, because it is a matter
of policy. And this item that you've excerpted is just one of a list of
specific disclaimers that were put here in response to criticisms and
misunderstandings of AppArmor in the past.
Remember, the purpose of *this* document is to define the security goals
that AppArmor has to live up to. It is fine to use it as a jumping off
point for design ideas that some system might employ some day, or even
proposed enhancements to AppArmor itself, but don't over-burden the
"security goal" document, it needs to be short & comprehensible.
>> * A confined process can operate on a file descriptor passed to it
>> by an unconfined process, even if it manipulates a file not in the
>> confined process's profile. To block this attack, confine the
>> process that passed the file descriptor.
>>
> This should not count as an 'attack' given that the unconfined process
> would either be trusted, or be mallicious and fall inside the "influence"
> of the confined process anyway.
>
It counts as a surprising result, and so is specifically disclaimed. I
can tell it is surprising, because it surprised Andi Kleen :)
Crispin
--
Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. http://crispincowan.com/~crispin
CEO, Mercenary Linux http://mercenarylinux.com/
Itanium. Vista. GPLv3. Complexity at work
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