> CIPSO is supported on SELinux as well.
That's no reason to extend that design mistake.
> It certainly has uses where IPSec
> is excessive. One example is someone I talked to recently that basically
> has a set of blade systems connected with a high speed backplane that
> looks like a network interface. CIPSO is useful in this case because
> they can't afford the overhead of IPSec but need to transfer the level
> of the connection to the other machines. The backplane is a trusted
> network and that isn't a dangerous assumption in this case.
If one of the boxes gets broken in all are compromised this way?
> CIPSO also lets systems like SELinux and SMACK talk to other trusted
> systems (eg., trusted solaris) in a way they understand.
Perhaps, but is the result secure? I have severe doubts.
> I don't
> regularly support CIPSO as I believe IPSec labeling is more useful in
> more situations but that doesn't mean CIPSO is never useful.
Security that isn't secure is not really useful. You might as well not
bother.
-Andi
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