On Thu, 21 Jun 2007, Lennart Sorensen wrote:
On Thu, Jun 21, 2007 at 10:26:04AM -0700, [email protected] wrote:
the bios doesn't have enough capability to talk to the outside world for
updates.
Of course, although perhaps it could. More likely my thought was that
the service when it decides to download an update, would include the
updated bios image and put it on the boot drive where the existing bios
can find it. No signature needs to be added to the boot drive or
kernel, just checksums in the bios image.
what tivo actually does is very similar to this
they encode into the bios the ability to check a checksum/signature for
the kernel+boot filesystem and if they don't match look to see if there is
another kernel+boot filesystem available
then software on the boot filesystem checks to see if the rest of the
system has been tampered with before it mounts /
you snippede the bit about not knowing how to stop it
the GPLv3 is trying to do this.
Perhaps they should just explicitly say that then.
they call the section the anti-tivoization, how much more explicit can
they get?
David Lang
by the way, just in case anyone is misunderstanding me. I don't believe
for a moment that all these anti-tamper features actually work in the real
world (the PS3 hacking kits are proof of the lengths people will go to to
make the 'hard' hardware-level hacking trivial to do) but the approach
needs to be at secure modulo hardware tampering or software bugs.
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