Re: [PATCH 0/6] MODSIGN: Kernel module signing

Hi!

> Now, this is not a complete solution by any means: the core kernel is not
> protected, and nor are /dev/mem or /dev/kmem, but it denies (or at least
> controls) one relatively simple attack vector.

Could we fix the /dev/*mem holes, first? They are already used by
malicious modules (aka rootkits...).  Or can selinux already provide
/dev/*mem protection with no way for admin to turn it off?

-- 
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