David Howells wrote:
James Morris <[email protected]> wrote:
Well, the value can be changed at any time, so you could be using a
temporary fscreate value, or your new value could be overwritten
immediately by writing to /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
Ah. Hmmm. By whom? In selinux_setprocattr():
if (current != p) {
/* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
security attributes. */
return -EACCES;
}
But current busy inside the cache and can't do this.
I think we need to add a separate field for this purpose, which can only
be written to via the in-kernel API and overrides fscreate.
So, like my acts-as security ID patch?
Would it still need to be controlled by MAC policy in that case?
Yes - if we are going to perform some MAC checks for this kernel process
we need to have all checks performed.
Doing so is
a bit of a pain as it means I have a whole bunch of extra failures I still
need to check for,
This is true for going this route in general rather than simply
bypassing MAC. I don't think halfway makes any sense.
and the race in which the rules might change is still a
possibility I have to deal with.
I don't think this is a race, it is revocation of access. If you check
the access at every operation and correctly deal with access failures,
then this shouldn't be a problem. Yes it is a pain, but that is how
SELinux is supposed to work.
Karl
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