Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>I think what we really want are stacked security modules.
>
>I have not yet fully digested all of the requirements for multiple servers
>on the same machine but increasingly the security aspects look
>like a job for a security module.
>
>Enforcing policies like container A cannot send signals to processes
>in container B or something like that.
>
>
We could even end up making security modules to implement standard unix
security. ie, which processes can send any signal to other processes.
Why hardcode the (!sender.user_id || (sender.user_id == target.user_id)
) rule at all? That rule should be the default rule in a security module
chain.
I just think that doing it this way is the wrong way around, but I guess
I'm hardly qualified to speak on this. Aren't security modules supposed
to be for custom security policy, not standard system semantics ?
Sam.
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to [email protected]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
[Index of Archives]
[Kernel Newbies]
[Netfilter]
[Bugtraq]
[Photo]
[Stuff]
[Gimp]
[Yosemite News]
[MIPS Linux]
[ARM Linux]
[Linux Security]
[Linux RAID]
[Video 4 Linux]
[Linux for the blind]
[Linux Resources]
